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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
CONRAD H. MORBY, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
WALTER LA\\'RENCE ROGERS, 
Appellant 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
THE CASE 
Case No. 
7698 
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in the 
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, on March 22, 
1951 (R 42) in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
defendant v\r alter Lawrence Rogers (appellant here) 
for the sum of $10,633.45 and costs $79.80. The judg .. 
ment became final for purposes of appeal when on 
April 18, 1951, appellant's motion for a judgment not. 
withstanding the verdict, or in lieu for a new trial filed 
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March 31, 1951 (R 43) was denied (R 43, 48). Notice 
of appeal was fil~d May 15, 1951 (R 49). The .appeal 
is from the judgment and the order refusing a judgment 
in defendant's favor or a new trial. 
The ease is one in tort for damages for the death 
of plaintiff's son Gary Morby, which resulted from a 
collision between ~a bicycle ridden by young Morby and 
an automobile driven by the appellant; on April 29, 
1951, near 5140 South 13th East in Salt Lake County, 
Utah. 
There were two defendants at the trial, the appel-
lant and his wife, but at the end of plaintiff's evi-
dence the tri,al court directed a dismissal in favor of 
the defendant wife (R 8 and 257). The appeal is by 
defendant Walter Lawrence Rogers only. 
THE FACTS 
There were no eye witnesses to this accident, ex-
cept app·ellant and his wife (R 181). There was the 
testimony of other ·witnesses but none of them saw 
the happening of the accident. 
Thirteenth East Street runs north and south and 
it is str~aight for a long distance. From about 56th 
South straight north on 13th East Street the grade 
is slightly descending (R 79) and the point of the acci-
dent was about at the bottom of the grade. From that 
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5 
point on gomg north the grade is slightly ascending 
(R 94). Thirteenth East Street is a two lane hard 
surfaced high,Yay and in the vicinity where the acci-
dent happened it is approximately 18 feet, wide with 
six feet dirt shoulders on either side. Rogers traveled 
north on the east side of the highway (R 101). He 
says a center line \Yas marked on the road but it was 
somewhat faint. Other witnesses testified there was 
no such mark. In the vicinity of where the accident 
took place an irrigation ditch or creek about ten feet 
wide parallels the highway on the west side (R 157). 
Practically opposite the point of the accident over this 
ditch is a wooden bridge leading into a lane going west 
across some farm land. 
There are no cross roads nor any intersection at 
the point of the accident and there is nothing to show 
the bridge leading in to the lane from either direction, 
unless a careful observation is made (R 107). 
Rogers was 65 years old .at the time of the trial 
and 64 at the time of the accident (R 98). He former-
ly had operated a street car and driven street motor 
buses for the traction company and Salt Lake City 
Lines in Salt Lake City, driving a motor bus for ten 
or twelve years. He had retired at the age of sixty 
and at the time of the trial had been retired for five 
years (R 98). He had operated an automobile twenty-
five years. 
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The Rogers live at about 23rd East and 94th South 
In .Salt Lake County (R 95), some six or seven miles 
from where the accident took place (R 96). The day 
of the accident he and Mrs. Rogers, in the automobile 
he was driving, entered upon 13th East Street from the 
east .and turned north on that street at 94th South Street 
(R99), and from there continued north to the point of 
the accident (R 99). 
South of the point of the accident Rogers noticed 
a boy on ~a bicycle in front of his automobile (R 102) 
traveling in the same direction as the automobile (R 
79-80). At about 200 feet behind the bicycle Rogers 
honked his horn (R 78). Rogers and the cyclist were 
both on the right hand side of the road proceeding 
north (R 79), the boy being on the extreme east side 
of the hard surface of the highway (R 87). The horn 
was sounded ag.ain when the car was about 20 feet 
from the boy and at a time when the automobile had 
started to move over to the left to pass, but neither 
time did the hoy indicate he had heard the horn (R 
79-80). Rogers turned to pass him, giving him plenty 
of room so the car could pass in safety and when the 
car got "around up a little ways", the boy cut sharply 
in front of the car, the front wheel came in contact 
with the right front bumper of the automobile (R 108) 
and the bicycle and the boy were tip·ped over (R 81). 
Before the boy on the bicycle made the turn referred 
to, he was on the right or east side of the highway 
and Rogers had gotten on the west side of the middle 
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line (R 109). Rogers swung his car to the left and 
"at that" he was almost to the' edge of the canal and 
''in we went'' ( R 82). Rogers applied his brakes ''a 
little" but he did not want to "run over" the boy so 
he pulled his car quickly to the left. Rogers states 
that when he first honked his horn he estimated the 
speed of his vehicle at about three times the speed of 
the bicycle (R 103) and said he was going about twenty 
miles per hour at the time the accident occurred and 
at about fifteen at the time he went into the creek (R 
86). When the car came to rest it was pointed north 
and was at the bottom of the creek. Evidently the 
creek is about the width of the car and the top~ of the' 
car was about level with the top of the bank of the 
creek ( R 85, 111). 
Rogers got out of the car and went to the boy. 
The boy was lying on his right side astride the bicycle, 
the bicycle somewhat on top of him (R 88) and he 
was lying toward the west side of the highway about 
three feet from the left edge, according to Rogers (R 
114). Rogers stated the boy's feet were about three 
feet from the left edge of the highway and his head 
extended toward the north and east (R 114, 117). The 
bicycle was taken to the side of the road and the boy's 
body Wtas also moved to the side of. the highway. Some 
boy came along later and rode the bicycle away (R 
81, 121). The p·oint where the boy made the sudden 
turn was about opposite the bridge across the creek 
and apparently the boy had intended turning to cross 
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the bridge (R 107). 
The boy never gave any signal of his intention 
to turn nor did he look around before he turned (R 147). 
The witness Erhenbach, a deputy sheriff at the 
time of the accident, said he arrived at the scene of 
the accident, that Rogers told him the approximate 
point of impact was ''about right here''; that point was 
two ·feet from the west edge of the tarred portion of 
the highW1ay. Rogers was asked by this witness how 
far away he was when he first "noticed there may be 
an accident'' and he was shown a point 78 feet south 
of the point of impact (R 154). 
This witness stated he made some measurements 
and that the rear end of the car was 27 feet eight 
inches north of the north edge of the bridge and that 
it was 42 feet from the place Rogers pointed out as 
the point of impact. The automobile at that time was 
in the creek. He also stated there was no indication 
of b:vake marks; that Rogers stated to him he tried 
to swing as far to the left as he could to avoid the 
accident after the boy pulled over in front of him 
(R 159, 160). The witness said he saw no evidence 
of an abrupt turn. The witness further stated that 
Rogers further told him he had been traveling 30 miles 
per hour and at the time of the accident w:a.s going 
ten miles per hour. The witness identified some photo-
graphs and said the rear mud guard on the bicycle 
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was bent as shown in the picture; that some paint on 
the mud guard was the same color as the paint on the 
automobile (R 168) and that the bent mud guard was 
the only damage appearing on the bicycle. The bicycle 
was introduced in evidence by plaintiff and in court 
this witness could not point out the paint on the bicycle 
after a thorough examination of a minute or so (R 
189-190), although the bicycle had been kept unused 
since the accident and without alteration (R 213, 227 ). 
Two of the witnesses stated they were in .a truck 
coming from the north and saw Rogers go into the 
road, pick the boy up and carry him to the side of 
the road and before he was moved it was their judg-
ment the boy was lying just west of th~ center of the~ 
highway (R 233, 241). 
Another witness Mrs. Rogers, for the defense, who 
had been dismissed as a defendant, testified young 
Morby gave no signal of his intention to turn, made 
no observation before he turned and that he made a 
sudden turn just as the automobile was to pass him and 
about three feet to the boy's left and that when that 
happened her husband turned to the left in an attempt 
to avoid young Morby and that the car then went on 
into the ditch (R 266, 277). She also testified that 
until he suddenly turned young Morby was at all times 
on the east half of the highway (R 264-5-6-). 
The Morby boy was thirteen years old on N ovem-
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ber 4, 1949 (R 253) so that on the day of the ,accident 
he was thirteen years six months and twenty-five days 
old. 
There was some evidence from which one could 
infer that young Morby's clothes were torn and scuffed 
up by the accident (R 251). The boy. had been de-
livering papers on a paper route that day substituting 
for another carrier and from the evidence he was the 
usual bright boy for his age, had ridden bicycles for · 
several years and had ridden in an automobile with 
his father and mother on many occasions (Evidence 
of Mr. and Mrs. Morby commencing R 210 and R 249). 
This is a brief recapitulation of the evidence. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS. 
1. Appellant's motion for directed verdict or ap-
p·ellant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict should have been granted. 
(a) The appellant was not negligent. 
(b) The plaintiff's decedent was negligent as 
a matter of law and his negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of the accident. 
(c) The last clear chance doctrine is not ap-
plicable to the facts of this case. 
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2. The trial ·court made Improper rulings with 
respect to evidence. 
3. The trial court Inisdirected the jury. 
(a) Instructions Nos. 3, 8, 9 and 10 were im-
proper and there was no evidence to support them. 
(b) Defendant's request No. 1 should have 
been given. 
(c) Instructions Nos. 11 and 12 were rmpro-
per. 
(d) Instruction No. 14 was Improper. 
ARGUMENT 
Although our statement of points cover several sub-
jects, yet some of them are related, and in the intereRt 
of brevity and cohesiveness they can be discussed to-
gether in the same portions of this brief, and so we 
will proceed in that fashion, under headings we think 
appropriate: 
The evidence of negligence (Point Ia). 
There is nothing in this record, either by word 
of mouth or physical facts that suggests this appellant 
was in any wise negligent. 
The greatest speed at which this automobile ever 
traveled was thirty miles per hour. The highway was 
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singularly free from traffic ; it was a good, dry road, 
ample in width, and a bright sunny day was in pro-
gress. Neither court nor jury could conclude this speed 
constituted negligence. 
The appellant observed this boy on the highw.ay 
long before he reached the vicinity of the accident. 
He obs~rved him constantly during the entire time when 
he first saw him and the point at which the accident 
took place. There was no reason for him not to ob-
serve him. No other vehicles were on the highway; 
no cross roads were passed; the road was straight; the 
weather was good and visibility clear. Appellant had 
his eye on the boy during all this period. There is 
no evidence to the contrary. 
In passing the bicycle, the evidence is that the 
appellant moved to the left side of the highway; gave 
the deceased plenty of room, signalled with his horn 
of his intention to pass the boy. When in the act of 
passing and at a time when the decendent had given 
no indication of any intention to turn or do anything 
but pursue his peaceful way north on the east side of 
the highway and without making any observations what-
ever, the boy suddenly and without any warning what-
soever, turned to the left and into the path the auto-
mobile was taking. There is no evidence to the con-
trary as to the suddenness of the turn and that it was 
made without signal or warning. 
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Plaintiff's theory is that both the bicycle and the 
automobile were traveling in the same direction as 
he charges in paragraph three of the complaint that 
both vehicles were proceeding in a northerly direction. 
It is also his theory that the bicycle was ahead of the 
automobile as he charges in subparagraph (g) of para-
graph 4 of the complaint that the defendants ''having 
observed the deceased on the highway ahead'', and also 
that the automobile overtook the bicycle because the 
same subparagrap-h charges that defendants failed to 
use care in ''overtaking the vehicle of deceased who 
was lawfully using said road.'' 
Now, the evidence is without dispute that the acci-
dent took place on the west half or southbound lane 
of this highway. The boy's body was to the west of 
the center of the highway, lying in a northeast-south-
west direction with his feet to the southwest. The auto-
mobile was in the ditch on the west side of the high-
way. There is nothing in the evidence to show that the 
boy was travelling anywhere but north on the right 
side of the road until he turned. 
So, if we ·rely on the evidence and do. not go off 
into some wild theory or into conjecture the only thing 
left is to conclude that the accident happ_ened ast ap-
pellant and the other eye witness said it did; i.e. while 
the automobile was in the .act of passing, the boy made 
a sudden turn into its path. 
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If one is going to go on the theory that oeing out 
1n an automobile on a clear day with little traffic is 
in and of itself a dangerous operation and that one 
doing so proceeds at his own risk, and is an insurer of 
the safety of another on a bicycle he is about to pass 
then negligence exists here. But such is not the law, 
and necessarily could not be. 
Duties on the highway are correlative, and the ap- · 
( 
pellant had the right to assume until the contrary 
appeared that the boy on the road ahead of him would 
obey the rules of the road and permit the passing of 
the bicycle by the automobile; that the boy would re-
main in his own lane of traffic until some indication 
of a contrary intention took place and that the boy 
would not change from one lane and make a turn with-
out giving .some indication of his intention so to do, 
by looking and signalling. 
Testing the appellant's conduct in the light of all 
of these circumstances can lead to but one conclu-
sion-the appellant was in no wise negligent, and the 
accident was caused by circumstances entirely beyond 
his control. 
The law does not expect superhuman conduct; the 
test is reasonable care in view of all the circumstances. 
Hindsight might dictate a different course of condu~t, 
but the difficulty of that is that hindsight does not 
eliminate the knowledge after acquired that the boy 
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would and did turn. As the events leading up to this 
accident unfolded, under the evidence in this case there 
was nothing that this appellanJt did or did not do that 
violated the rule of ordinary care. 
True, the appellant did not avoid hitting the boy. 
·The accident happened. But this accident was not the 
result of anything this appellant did or did not do. He 
and another witness, his wife, who at the time she 
testified was not a defendant in this action, both testi-
fied the boy made a sudden turn when the automobile 
was less than twenty feet away (Mrs. Rogers said less 
than ''two' car lengths or a little less'' R 264-5-6) .. Twice, 
in anwer to questions submitted by plaintiff's counsel the 
appellant stated things "happened pretty fast" (R 89, 
132). Rogers said he had about caught up with the boy 
when the boy started to turn (R 107), that th~ car was 
just turning around him when the boy started to turn 
and the boy was on Rogers' right and( the car p;artially 
on the left side of the highway at the time of the turn 
(R 105) and that the car travelled four or five feet 
from the time the boy started to turn to the time of 
the collision (R 108). Rogers stated the boy ~as going 
right straight ahead until he started to turn (R 87). 
Under these circumstances we fail to see any evi-
dence of negligence on the part of the appellant which 
proximately caused this accident. 
The instructions on negligence (Point 3a). 
By instruction No. 3 the trial court stated the 
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charged negligence to be five in number (R 25). They 
are just a rehash of the pleadings and amount to noth-
ing more than reading plaintiff's complaint, a practice 
condemned by this court. Shields vs. Utah Light q 
Traction Co., 105 Pac. 2d 347, 99 Utah 307. There is 
no evidence to support .any of them, except that the 
appellant did not avoid this accident. And as to that 
it is not negligence to fail to avoid an accident unless 
it be in the power of app·ellant to do so. The instruc-
tion was entirely improper and could lead the jury 
to believe that they should consider those i terns in de-
ciding whether ·or not the appell,ant was negligent. The 
only thing which could result was confusion and mis-
understanding. 
Instructions No. 8, 9 and 10 are equally at fault. 
These and instruction No. 3 in the particulars noted 
were excepted to (R 289, et seq) with great particular-
ity. 
Instruction No. 8 has to do with keeping the car 
under control; instruction No. 9 has to do with speed; 
and instruction No. 10 has to do with keeping a look-
out. It is the appellant's contention there was no basis 
in the evidence for a charge to the jury on any of these 
propositions. The car was under control at all times; 
there was no evidence of any excessive speed, in fact 
all the evidence is that it was extremely moderate, and 
certainly there is no evidence that this appellant at 
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any time failed to keep a lookout for th~l cyclist. 
The evidence is the speed was reduced and never 
was exc.essive, and to say there is evidence that the 
appellant failed to keep a lookout is to fly in the face 
of all the evidence, because all of it is that he saw the 
bicycle at all times and drove off the highway and into 
a deep canal or creek in an attempt to avoid what the 
decedent was doing. 
These instructions were bad because they had to do 
with claimed negligence about which there was no evi-
dence. This too has been condemned by this court. 
Shields vs. Traction Company, supra. 
Negligence of the deceased (Point 1 b). 
This particular phase of the case is raised on this 
appeal in several ways. It is raised by the motion for 
a directed verdict, by the motion for a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict, by the exceptions to the 
court's instruction No. 12 (R 27) and the r~efusal of 
the court to give appellant's request No. 1 (R 37). 
The evidence is without dispute that the deceased 
made a sudden turn out of the lane of traffic in which 
he was pToceeding and into another lane, and that he 
did so without signal and without making any obser-
vation. That this contributed to the accident cannot 
be gainsaid. A signal would have warned appellant of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
the intention to turn and a casual observation would 
have informed the deceased that he could not turn with-
out grave and imminent peril, and an accident would 
have been prevented. 
This .action by the decease contravened Section 57-
7-133, Utah code. Under that section no turn nor any 
movement right or left ·can be made until such turn 
or movement can be made with reasonable safety, and 
no such turn or movement shall be made if other traf-
fic may be affected without a proper signal given for 
at least 100 feet before the turn. 
Section 57-7-148 states: 
''Every person riding a bicycle upon a road-
way shall be subject to the provisions of this act 
applicable to the driver of a vehicle except as to 
special regulations in this act and except as to 
those provisions of this jact which by their nature 
can have no application.'' 
Now, it is common knowledge that children ride· bi-
cycles and particularly .children ten years and older. 
Everyone sees them riding bicycles. More children ride 
bicycles on the streets and highways than grownups. 
These are matters of constant observation. The court 
must conclude that the legislature in enacting Section· 
57-7-148 with . respect to bicycles and persons riding 
them appreciated this f1a.ct, and that it intended that 
children operating bicy:cles on the public highways 
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should be governed by the general provisions of Chap ... 
ter 7, Title 57, Utah code, being the traffic rules and 
regulations. When bicycles are being ridden on the 
highway they are a p·art and parcel of the traffic oper-
ating thereover, and those sections enacted to regulate 
and control traffic operate on bicycles. 
So we assert that Section 57-7-133 applies to chil-
dren ri<llng bicycles. 
In construing other sections of Chapter 7 of Title 
57, this court in North v. C·artw'fiight, 229 Pacific (2) 
871, said: 
''These statutes were promulgated for the 
protection of the public and to safeguard pro-
perty, life and limb of persons using the high-
ways from accidents of the type here involved. 
Violations of these statutes then constitutes negli-
gence in law. This doctrine of the law has heen 
steadfastly adhered to by this court and gener-
ally in other courts throughout the United States 
* * * 'When a standard of duty or care is fixed 
by law or ordinance, and such law or ordinance 
has reference to the safety of life, limb or pro-
perty, then, as a matter of necessity, a violation 
of such law or ordinance constitutes neligence.' '' 
It is our contention that 57-7-133 applies to the 
deceased and that he was hound to obey it, notwith-
standing his age being slightly under fourteen. We 
cite Graha»n v. Johnson, 166 Pacific (2) 230, 109 Utah 
346, where a minor, thirteen years old, was injured by 
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an automobile and this court, in holding him negligent 
as a matter of .law said: 
''We start with not only the assumption but 
the knowledge that Gary was negligent in play-
ing in the street in violation of Sec. 5321, Re-
vised ordinances, Salt Lake City, 1944, which 
provides in effect that it sh:all be unlawful for 
any person to obstruct any street by playing 
games thereon, such as the game of ball, or 
annoy or obstruct free travel of any vehicle." 
Section 57-7-133 was designed for the protection 
of the deceased in riding a bicycle on the highway as 
well .as other traffic thereon, and the results of this 
accident and his failure to obey the statute graphi-
cally illustrates that it was so designed. 
This is not any new or novel proposition. Other 
courts have passed upon the question. We call this 
court's attention to Sagar v. Joseph Burnett Company, 
190 Atlantic 258, where the Supreme Court of Con-
necticut had before it a case involving a boy ten years 
old riding a bicycle, with a companion on the handle-
bars, who came into collision with an automobile driven 
by the defendant. The boy was making a left turn at 
an intersection and in doing so did not keep to th'b 
right of the center of the intersection but cut the in-
tersection. While so doing a collision between the bi-
cycle and the defendant's automobile took place, caus-
ing injuries to the boy. The Supreme Court of Con-
necticut said : 
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'' * * * The trial court referred to the statute 
(General Statutes, Cu. Supp. 1935, Sec. '636c) 
'which provides that when the operator of 'any 
vehicle - and that includes a bicycle - is mak-
ing a left turn at the intersection of two public 
highways he must at all times keep his vehicle 
to the right of the center point of the intersec-
-tion,' and charged that 'a violation of this 
statute - is negligence in itself. Accordingly, 
if you should find that the plaintiff did violate 
this statute then you must conclude that he was 
negligent in that particular, an·d if you con-
clude that he violated that statute or that he 
was negligent in any other particular and that 
such violation or such negligence was a substan-
tial factor in producing his own injuries, then 
you have found that he was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence. * * *' Just previously the 
court had called attention to the jage of the plain-
tiff and had charged that his conduct so far .as 
concerned his claimed negligence was to be meas-
ured by that which is reasonably to be expected 
of children of similar age, judgment :and exper-
ience. Marfyak v. New England Transporta-
tion Co., 120 Conn. 46, 50, 179 A. 9. The plain-
tiff claims that the same test should be applied 
in determining whether violation of the statute 
by him would constitute negligence and assigns 
error in the failure to so charge specifically in 
that connection. Reading as a whole the charge 
as to contributory negligence, we consider it 
very likely that the jury may have been led 
thereby to apply the qualifications as to age, 
judgment and experience to the plaintiff's .al-
leged conduct in violating the statute as well 
as to his conduct in other respects, and, if so, 
the plaintiff certainly would have no reason to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
complain. 
''That aside, however, we find no justifica-
tion for the application of this qualification to 
the effect of violation of the statute as negli-
gence per se. Frisbie v. Schinto, 120 Conn. 412, 
415, 181 A. ·535. Neither the statute nor any of 
our decisions under it suggest such an exception 
to its operation. The terms of the statute are 
clear and precise as to the course to be pursued · 
by a vehicle in turning left in an intersection· and 
which mai, be expected· to be taken by others. 
Andrew v. White Bus Line Corp., 115 Conn. 
464, 466, 161 A. 792; Murphy v. Way, 107 Conn. 
0 , 
633, 637, 141 A. 858. 'It 1s the duty of the courts 
to apply it in accord with the intent expressed 
in the act, without limitation or exception or 
extension.' Washburn v. LaMay, 116 C-onn. 576, 
578, 165 A. 791, 792. 
''As we stated in Murphy v. Way, supra, 
107 Conn. 633, at page 638, 141 A. 858, the pur-
poses of the statute would be subverted if the 
standards of conduct prescribed by it could be 
subjected to exceptions based upon the judg-
ment of the individual user of the highway, 
and this consideration would be conspicuously 
applicable in the case of such a user whose ca-
pacity to exercise judgment. was affected by 
immaturity and inexperience. While the incapa-
cities of youth are to be accorded due weight 
in matters of intent .and criminal responsibility, 
it is not· unreasonable or unfair to hold appli-
cable to all operators of vehicles the rule that 
he who violates one of these statutory man-
dates does so at his own risk. Murphy v. Way, 
supra. 
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"Although most of the states reg,ard im-
maturity in measuring the conduct of children 
in determining questions of negligence (45 C. J. 
p. 998), no case has come to our attention in 
which children have been excepted from the 
operation of the rule which most states have 
long applied ( 45 C. J. 720) that violation of a 
statutory duty constitutes negligence. On the 
other hand, they have been denied recovery re-
peatedly for injuries of which the p·roximate 
cause was coasting upon a public way in viola-
tion of law. Wright v. Salzberger & Son, 63 Cal. 
App. 450, 218 P. 785, 63 Cal. App. 450, 218 P. 
785' ', and other cases cited. 
In the case of Brown v. Daley, 173 N. E. 545, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had before 
it a case involving injuries to two children, five and 
seven years .old, growing out of a coasting accident. 
The defendant contended the accident took place on a 
street where coasting was prohibited and the Massaehu-
setts court held that if the accident did take place on 
that street no recovery could be had for the death of 
the two children because the negligence of the children 
would bar recovery. The court, however, held that there 
was a fact question present as to whether or not the 
children were actually coasting on the street at the 'time 
of the accident and stated that because the jury had 
heard the evidence and viewed the p·remises the jury 
verdict would not be disturb-ed. 
Without specific reference to this statute, Section 
57-7-133, this Court, in Sp,ackman v. Carson, 216 Paci-
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fie (2) 640, states: 
'' * * * A person making a turn out of one 
line across another line of traffic is the one who 
first knows that he intends to change his direc-
tion from that in which it would otherwise be 
presumed that he intended to eontinue. Any 
person traveling in the line of traffic which the 
direction changer intends to cross can only be 
apprised of the latter's intention to change di-
rection on signal or upon seeing him start to 
make the change. It is not as if there were a 
telephonic system between the brain of the di-
rection changer .and those who :are to be affected. 
Therefore, the man who makes the change of 
direction owes the duty of looking before he 
makes it and of signaling clearly and timely, 
and of making the change sufficiently slowly 
so as to give time for other drivers who may be 
aff ecterll by it to be alerted and to react to that 
signal.'' 
This decedent did nothing, under the evidence in 
this case, except turn. He did not look, he gave no in-
dication of his intention to turn. When the automobile 
was a short distance behind him and to his side he 
suddenly turned and continued into that turn until a 
collision occurred. His negligence continued up to the 
very time of the accident; his sudden turn without a 
warning or any observation in the path of onrushing 
danger brought about this unfortunate accident. There 
seems to us no question but that that is the case here. 
The motion for a directed verdict should have been 
granted and on the motion being presented the court 
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should have set the verdict aside and entered judgment 
for the defendant, no cause of action. 
The instructions on the negligence of tbe deceased (Points 
3b, 3c). 
(i) Appellant's Requested Instruction No.1. 
In the event there may have been a question of 
fact in the case, appellant submitted his instruction No. 
1 to the trial court, which the trial court refused to 
give. 
This request (R 37) incorporates in it the ·duties of 
a traveler on the highway who is about to make a turn 
and actually turns from the lane in which he is riding 
across another lane of traffic in order to reach a point 
off the highway. As heretofore pointed out, the evi-
dence in this case is that the decedent while going north 
on the east side of the highway turned to his left across 
another lane of the highway and under all the evidence 
it is apparent that he intended to turn into a farm lane 
leading from the highway to the west side. This lane 
crossed a bridge over 'a creek which was also on the 
west side of the highway. The instruction ·calls 
the attention of the jury to three things which 
such a traveler must do before making, or while 
in the act of making, such a turn. They are: (1} That 
before making the turn he must indicate his intention 
to do so by giving visible signals; (2) That he cannot 
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make the turn unless he can do so with safety, and (3) 
That it is his duty to make observations in order to 
ascertain whether or not he can make the turn with 
safety. By the instruction it is left to the jury t~ de-
termine whether or not Gary Morby failed to do any 
of the things enumerated and the request was formu-
lated on the theory that if there is jury question as to 
what Morby did or failed to do yet the jurY, should be 
appraised of what he was required to do in making such 
a turn. 
Under the statute, Section 57-7-133, it is perfectly · 
apparent that no turn should be made until it can be 
made with reasonable safety; that no turn can be made, 
if other traffic may be affected, without a proper signal 
given indicating the intention to turn, and it necessarily 
follows, that observations must be made in order to 
determine whether or not a turn can be made with 
safety and that one who makes a turn without making 
observations cannot comply with the . requirements of 
the statute and, therefore, on~ who fails to make such 
observations is guilty of negligence, .as a matter of law. 
It is our contention that even though the court should 
determine that the question of Morby's negligence was 
for the jury- to decide, yet an instruction informing the 
jury of the decedent's duty in the language of this in-
struction, or some instruction in substance like it, should 
have been given to the jury. Nowhere in any of the 
court's instructions did the court include all the ele-
ments set forth in this request as applied to Gary 
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Morby, and it is our contention in failing so to do the 
trial court committed reversible error. 
Ordinary common intelligence demands that a p·er-
son in the position of Gary Morby on this highway and 
intending to make a turn to the left should do some-
thing to protect himself. He must do something to 
ascertain whether or not the turn can be made with 
safety and this, of course, requires observations, ;and 
in addition he must give a signal of his intention to 
turn if his turn will ·affect traffic. If ha makes a turn 
without giving a signal he takes his chances because the 
requirement of signaling is for his protection 'as well 
as, others. Under the facts of this case, when this turn 
was made or about to be made, there can be no question 
but that other traffic would he and was affected, and 
·seriously affected by the deceased's turn. 
Irrespective of the statute., ordinary care would 
dictate these very things. In the case cited and quoted 
from above, i. e., Spackman v .. Carson, supra, this court, 
without any reference to any statute and in discussing 
what one should do who is about to change his course on 
the highway, sets forth all the elements of this st-atute. 
Gary M-orby was the only one who knew he intended to 
turn. Gary Morby was the only one who could inform 
himself as to what the conditions were. Gary Morby 
was the only one who knew when he intended to turn 
and in order to protect himself from injury or the loss 
of his life, ordinary care dictated that he should look 
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before he changed his course and that he should signal 
if a turn would affect traffic and further that he should 
not change his course unless he could negotiate his new 
route with safety. No person on the highway could 
possibly determine whether or not he could make a 
turn in safety or determine whether or not traffic would 
be affected by his turning or whether or not a signal 
was: required unless he looked to see what other traffic 
was on the road. Defendant's proposed instruction No. 
1 makes the test that if Gary Morby "failed to give a 
signal'' * * * "or failed to make observations as to 
whether or not a turn could be made with sa£ety'', he 
lS guilty of negligence as a matter of law. 
The minimum requirements under our statute of 
any p·erson u~ing the highway under the circumstances 
in this case would be that he look and signal and if he 
fails to do ~ither he is guilty of negligence as a matter 
of law. 
Although we contend that a 13 year old boy riding 
a bicycle on a public highway is bound absolutely by 
the rules of the road as set forth in our argument com-
mencing at page 17 of this brief, we would like to point 
out to this court that Gary Morby's judgment as such 
13 year old is never involved in this case and cannot 
be tested by the standard of 13 year old hoys of similar 
capacity unless he has some basis upon w·hic.h to form 
that judgment, that is, wnless he looks around him on 
the highw'ay to see what the situation is at the time he 
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intends to make a tu~rn; and further we contend that 
the jury should have been informed that these mini .... 
mum requirements must be met before they ·can test 
\vhether or not Gary Morby, as a 13 year old boy, 
acted with due care, and if they find that he failed to 
meet these minimum requirements he was guilty of neg-
ligence as a matter of law. 
If there is a question of fact in this case as to 
what Gary Morby did or did not do, it was reversible 
error to refuse to give this instruction. 
(ii) Instructions No.'s 11 and 12. 
Appellant's first objection to instruction No. 12 is 
that the statute, Section 57-7-133, and its fair construc-
tion, does not exempt a 13 year old boy because of his 
'age when he is riding a bicycle on the highway from his 
failure to abide by the rules of the road set up in that 
statute. We have already argued that because Gary 
Morby was on a bicycle, was a user of the highway on 
such bicycle, that he is hound by the statute. In instruct-
ing the jury as the court did in instruction No. 12, that 
the jury could consider the age of Gary Morhy in de-
ciding whether or not he was negligent, the court vio-
lated the plain terms of the statute because this statute 
was meant to cover Gary Morby and set an absolute 
standa,rd of care for him while he was riding the bi-
cycle on 13th East on the day in question and Gary 
Morby's conduct should have been tested against that 
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standard of care without reference to his age. 
We helieve the foregoing argument in respect to the 
negligence of Gary Morby and the law 'applicable there-
to· which we have set out in our argument is conclusive 
as to the deceased's negligence in this case, and this i~ 
true whether or not this court feels there is a question 
of fact involved. Notwithstanding the foregoing argu-
ment, however, if this court feels that Gary Morby's 
conduct should be tested by what reasonably prudent 
boys of his age and capacity would have done and if 
this court feels that an appropriate instruction in this 
regard should have been given to the jury, then we 
submit the following argument which points out the er-
rors in the instruction that the trial court g:ave to the 
jury on the trial of this cause. 
The trial court sets forth in instruction No. 11 the 
duties required of an adult in making a turn upon a pub-
lic highway and they are : To give a visible signal of 
his intention, to turn, not to make such turn unless he 
can do so with ·s,afety, and to look and see whether or 
not such turn or change of lane can be made with safety. 
Then in instruction No. 12 the trial court states that 
a boy of 13 years of age is not held to the standards 
of care and eaution of 1an adult person, and goes on and 
states that as a matter of law it would he negligence 
for all_ adult to make a turn in violation of the duties 
as set forth above without indicating by 'a proper signal 
his intention so to do; but then, when the court instructs 
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the jury as to the elements and circumstances that they 
should consider in deciding whether or not a 13 year 
old boy was guilty of negligen·ce, the only circumstance 
the trial court put before the jury was whether ''a .rea-
sonably prudent person of the ag-e of 1-3 would know and 
appreciate the danger of. trying to make such a turn 
without signaling.'' Nothing is· said about whether or 
not a 13 year old boy is required to look, nothing is ·said 
as to whether or not a 13 year old boy has to make a 
turn in safety. The entire instruction deals only with 
the appreciation of danger of turning without signaling. 
Under this instruction the jury could find that Gary 
Morby did not appreciate the danger of making 'a turn 
without signaling and as a consequence was not negli-
gent and did not, therefore, contribute to his own death, 
and the jury could have so found irrespective of whether 
or not it would have found Gary Morby, or any other 
13 year ·old boy of like capacity, would have looked and 
would :Q.ave refrained from turning because a turn could 
not be made with reasonable safety. The measuring 
stick under the instruction is whether or not a 13 year 
old ·should have made the turn without giving a signal. 
We insist that it should have also included whether or 
not said 13 year old should have looked and should have 
refrained from making a turn until it could have been 
made with reasonable safety. 
These omissions from the ·court's instruction No. 12 
are doubly app,a,rent when compared with the elements 
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set forth in instruction No. 11, supra. It is submitted 
that the jury in eomparing these two successive instruc-
tions would necessarily conclude that although an adult 
is held to the duty of looking to see whether or not a 
turn can be made with safety and not turning unless 
he ·can do so with s1a.fety, that a hoy of 13 years of age 
is not held to such a duty, and that such duties are not 
even matters for the jury to consider. 
Whether a person, adult or child, aets as a reason-
ably pTudent person and whether a person meets the 
standards of care required by the law should be deter-
mined by a consideration of .all of the circumstances o.f 
the transaction. The only difference in the standard 
of care between an adult and a child, in the absence of 
an express statute setting the same standard for each, 
is that the child is only held to the standard of conduct 
of doing that which other children of the same age and 
like capacity would have done under like circumstances. 
As applied to this case, the requirement of looking to 
determine the situation on the highway 1and· the require-
ment of turning with safety after having made such an 
observation, are not eliminated from the case as a matter 
of law merely because the deceased is a 13 year old boy. 
These are elements by which the jury should have 
judged whether or not Gary Morby acted ~a.s a reason-
ably prudent boy of his age and capacity would have 
acted. The tri1al court should have so instructed the 
jury and its failure so to instruct was prejudicial error. 
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Errors in the admission of evidence (Point 2). 
The matter about which we complain here can be 
found at pages 154, 155 and 156 of the record. It all 
started out when the witness Erlenbach stated, in 1answer 
to a question, that 
''Seventy-eight feet represents the course 
the vehicle No.1 traveled according to Mr. Rogers 
when I asked him how far away he was when he 
first noticed there may be an accident, and that's 
the point to which he took me and showed me. 
From that point I taped it off with a tape.'' 
Some discussion went on between counsel and the wit-
ness, and then counsel, after referring to the point of 
impact, asked 
'' * * * about how far south of that point did 
Mr. Rogers point out to you was the spot where 
he first realized there was going to be an acci-
dent?'' 
An objection was made that the question did not con-
tain the witness's .testimony, and the court misunder-
stood the objection as 1a reading of the transc-ript will 
show. Then there was some further discussion and coun.:. 
sel then asked 
''And pointed out to you the place where he 
first realized that an accident w·as goilng to oc-
cur?" (R 155) 
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which was objected to as leading and suggestive, which 
objection was overruled, and then the next question 
contained this 
''Will you point to the spot * * * at which 
Mr. Rogers first told you or told you that he first 
realized that an accident was going to occur~'' 
which was objected to that it assumed Rogers told him 
something. And then at page 156 counsel ragain offends 
by going into it -again and ·characterized it as 
'' * * * where he (Rogers) told you he first 
saw, realized that there w~as going to he an acci-
dent." 
A further objection is m~de and the trial court left it 
up to the witness to say whether or not he had been 
misquoted and the witness said, ''No, that's the question 
we ask every driver, Judge." 
So, the argument might be well made that the wit-
ness cleared up the whole thing with a negative and 
then a positive, exactly opposite to each other, and also 
that we are being hypertechnical in the extreme. But 
the sco~e of :the questions, the manner in which counsel 
changed them from time to time, first from ''there may 
he'' to ''there was going to be'' and then from 'a ques-
tion by the witness to the appellant to a flat footed 
statem~nt by the appellant that he ''realized there was 
going to be an accident,'' all show the vice of this kind 
of interrogation. 
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How much damage these questions did is specula-
tive; it is apparent the trial court was paying no p1arti-
cular attention to what was going on, an·d it is also 
apparent that counsel persisted in improper questions 
and that they gained in their degree of imp·ropriety 1as 
he proceeded. But it is clear that the ·above illustrates 
one way how not to conduct a lawsuit. 
A careful reading ·of the rest of this witness' testi-
mony will show thaf counsel continually led the wit-• 
ness (who was perfectly friendly to the plaintiff's cause 
as indicated by his testimony), that some objections 
were made and that some were sustained. As a practical 
proposition, it is poor tactics before a jury to continually 
made objections that questions are leading or sugges-
tive, but trial courts should be quick to prevent such 
questions on matters of importance~. 
It might well be that this court will consider this 
matter of insufficient moment by itself to necessitate 
a reversal of this cause, but certainly with the other 
errors heretofore and hereafter pointed out it indicates 
how loosely this case was tried by the trial court, and 
how careless he was of the rights of this appell1ant. 
The evidence on the last clear chance doctrine (~oint lc). 
Imme<liately prior to the occurrence of this· acci-
dent, the evidence was that the two vehicles were go-
ing north on the same side of the road (R 79, 102, 140); 
that the bicycle was somewhere in the northbound 
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of the highway. Apparently some incident occurred 
when the appellant was 78 feet to the rear of the point 
of impact which gave him some apprehension of danger 
(R 127-131, 254, 182. The de·puty sheriff never ques-
tion appellant what occurred at this paint. Counsel 
for plaintiff never asked him either; . and when ap-
pellant's counsel inquired into this matter the appel-
lant testified that at the time the boy was still on the 
right side of the highway and was going north (R. 140). 
At that time the appellant was beginning to taper off 
to the left side of the highway to pass the dece~ased 
(R 154, 160 and the map). A fair inference from the 
facts, and undoubtedly the worst inference which could 
be dr,awn against the appellant, would be that at this 
point, when the appellant was 78 feet back of the point 
of impact, the boy was changing his position on the 
highway. (R. 87, 105, 106), but the boy had not then 
started his turn (R. 106, 107). After appellant started 
out around deceased, the appel1ant estimated he was 
approximately 20 feet behind the boy (R 129), and 
appellant stated he honked the horn of his automobile 
(R 130), and as he drew alongside of the boy to pass 
him, he apparently then beeame ,aware the boy had not 
heard the horn of his automobile (R 104, 80). An in-
stant before the collision, when the appellant was not 
quite abreast of the boy, the deceased suddenly turned 
across the highway and into the car (R 80, 106-108, 
142, 266, and Exhibit E). It w~as the :appellant's esti-
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mate that the car moved only 5 feet from the time the 
by made the sudden turn until the impact (R 108). 
This point of in1pact was 2 feet in from the west edge 
of the hard surface of the highway (Map), and the 
right front bumper of app·ellant's automobile eame in 
contact with the front wheel of the bicycle (R 81, 26'6), 
and the boy tipped over. The hoy's body was lying 
only a few feet from the point of impact (R 114, Map 
181, 189). The appellant in his effort to avoid the boy 
turned to his extreme left and went into the ditch 
running along the west side of the highway. The ap-
pellant's speed at the outset of this sequence of events 
was given variously from 20 to 30 miles per hour (R 
102, 86, 160) and his speed .at the time he went into 
the ditch was approximately 10 to 15 miles per hour 
(R 86, 160). 
Twice pl:tintiff's counsel elicited from the appel-
lant that "things happened pretty fast'' (R 89) or 
"were happening pretty fa~t" (R 132). 
At 30 miles per hour the appellant would have 
traveled 78 feet in 1.77 seconds and .at 20 miles per 
hour he would have traveled this .distance in 2.65 sec-
onds. During this entire period of time the relative 
position of the two vehicles was always changing, the 
car moving over to the left of the highway to pass, 
and the boy moving a little to the left ·and then back 
to the right on the e.ast side of the highway, and then 
later, suddenly turning to the left as appellant drew 
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along side of him. ·On the evidence most unfavorable 
to the appellant this entire sequence of events took 
place within 2.65 seconds and the period of time from 
the point where the hoy suddenly turned until the col-
lision occurred was much shorter, in fact, nearly in-
stantaneous. Appellant stated that his car moved only 
5 feet after deceased turned before the collision and 
the appellant's wife testified that the deceased was 12 
to 14 feet away from the car at the time he turned 
( R 108, 266). These distances could be covered by the 
respective parties in much less time than a second. 
Appellant had a right to rely upon the deceased'~ 
acting in a prudent and intelligent manner notwith-
standing his age, and ·appellant had no reason to anti~ 
cip~ate the boy would turn without looking or signaling. 
The evidence is that the appellant gave the boy ade-
quate room as he came along side (R 80). Under these 
c~rcumstances no reasonable person could find that the 
appellant at any time had a clear opportunity to avoid 
the deceased after having discovered or being aware 
that the deceased was in a position of peril from which 
he could not extricate himself or of which the deceased 
was unaWiare. 
In recent decisions of this court the ·elements of 
the last clear chance doctrine have been set forth with 
great clarity and as we understand them the elements 
of that doctrine are: 1. Th·at one party is in a position 
of peril of which he is unaware or from which he can-
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not extricate himself; 2. That the defendant is aware, 
not of the other party's existence or presence on the 
scene, but, of the other party's peril and of such party's 
inability to extricate himself or unaw-areness of the 
peril ; 3. That such consciousness on the part of the 
defendant must occur early enough in the sequence of 
events to afford him a clear opportunity to avoid a 
collision through the exercise of ordinary care. It fol-
lows from the foregoing, of course, that if either of the 
parties has -an equal opportunity to avoid the accident 
that the last clear chance doctrine is inapplicable. The 
defendant must not only have a clear opportunity to 
avoid the accident but the last opp·ol"tunity. Applying 
this law to the case at hand, it cannot he said by any 
reasonable person that the appellant had at any time 
during this sequence of events, the last clear chance 
to a void this collision. 
At the time this boy made a sudden turn to the 
left the interval of time w-as so short before the colli-
sion occurred that it would be impossible for appellant 
to avoid striking the boy. As we have stated, the dis-
tance the two vehicles were then ap1art could be easily 
covered in less than a S'econd of time. A situation som,e-
what similar to this was considered in the case of Van 
Dyke v. Atlantic Greyhou;nd Corporation et al, 10 S. E. 
(2) 727 which was decided by the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina in 1940. In the ease the court stated 
the facts to be as follows : 
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"Plaintiff's intestate, a boy 14 years of age, 
on the morning of August 25, 1939, was riding a 
bicycle on the highway near the corporate limits 
of the City of Henderson, proceeding eastwardly 
on the Louisburg Road. The day was clear and 
the road was level and straiglit. The defendant, 
the Atlantic Greyhound Corporation,_ was oper-
ating two large buses on the highway, both pro-
ceeding in the same direction as plaintiff's inte-
state. The distance between the buses was testi-
fied to be 100 feet, though other witnesses esti-
mated this distance at 100 yards. The evidence 
tended to fix the speed of the buses at from 25 
to 40 miles per hour. Plaintiff's intestate had 
delivered a paper to a house on the south side 
of the highway, and had ridden back to the high-
w,ay. 
''As the first or front bus approached plain-
tiff's intestate, he was riding upon the paved 
portion of the highway, and when the horn of 
the bus was sounded he rode off on the shoulder 
of the highway, which was four and a half feet 
wide at that point, and was riding three feet from 
the edge of the pavement. As the second bus, 
the one following in the rear of the first, at-
proached, plaintiff's intestate suddenly, and 
without giving any notice of his intention so to 
do, turned to his left on the paved portion of the 
road and immediately in front of the bus, where 
he was struck and killed. There Wias some evi-
dence that the bus which struck the plaintiff's 
intestate ·did n·ot sound the horn until too late, 
and that just as the boy came on the pavement 
immediately in front of the bus, a distance esti-
mated at 15 or 20 feet, the driver of the bus 
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turned sharply to his left to avoid striking the 
boy, but 'the extreme right front corner' of the 
bus 'mashed in' the left side of the bicycle, caus-
ing the death of plaintiff's intestate. The bus 
ran off into the ditch on the left of the highway.'' 
And quoted as follows from one of the witnesses: 
"'When the boy ran up on the paved portion 
of the highway in front of the bus (the bus) 
must have been not more than 15 feet from him. 
If he had looked to the left at all before he went 
on the paved highway there was nothing to keep 
him from seeing the bus. ' '' 
After considering the facts of the case the court 
stated as follows: 
"While the testimony relating to this un-
fortunate occurrence, taken in the light most fav-
orable for the plaintiff, might tend to show some 
negligence on the part of ·defendants, a careful 
consideration of all the evidence offered by plain-
tiff leads us to the conclusion that the f1ailure 
of plaintiff's intestate to exercise due care and 
precaution for his own safety must be held to 
constitute the sole proximate cause, or at least 
a proximate contributing cause, of his injury 
and death. There was no evidence which would 
permit an inference other than that the hoy, 
without signal or warning, and apparently with-
out looking or seeing the oncoming bus, turned 
suddenly in front of the bus at a time when, in 
spite of the efforts of the driver, it was too late 
to avoid striking the bicycle. There are no cir-
cumstance·s here which would relieve the plain-
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tiff's intestate of the conclusive imputation of 
contributory negligence. * * * '' (citing cases) 
"It will be noted that under our motor ve-
hicle statutes a bicycle is deemed a vehicle, and 
the rider of a bicycle upon the highway is sub-
ject to the applicable provisions of the statutes 
relating to motor vehicles. Public Laws, 1939, 
Ch. 275. 
'' There was no evidence to support plain-
tiff's plea seeking to invoke the principle of last 
clear chance. Morris v. Transportation Co., 208 
N. C. 807, 182 S. E. 487; Haynes v. Southern R. R. 
Co., 182 N. C. 679, 110 S. E. 56. There was no 
evidence that more than a fraction of a second 
elapsed after plaintiff turned on to the pave-
ment before the collision between the bus and the 
bicycle occurred. Nor was there evidence that 
there was anything to indicate to the driver of 
defendant's bus that plaintiff's intestate was in 
a position of peril, or that he intended to turn to 
his- left upon the pavement in front of the bus.'' 
(Citing cases) 
In this case just prior to the boy's making a sud-
den turn the app·ellant was angling around him, had 
honked his horn and the boy was somewhere to his 
right and forw-ard of him, on the east side of the high-
way. At this point we submit that the boy was not 
in a position of peril and as this court so aptly stated 
in the case of Holmgren v. Union Pac. ~. R. Co., 198 
Pacific ( 2) 459, at page 463, in quoting from a Calif· 
ornia ease, the hoy must be in a position of peril not 
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approacking one; we quote : 
"It is also significant to note that the 'situa-
tion of danger' or 'position of danger,' referred 
to in the authorities dealing with the last clear 
chance doctrine, is reached only when a plaintiff, 
moving toward the path of an on coming t:r"~ain or 
vehicle, has reached a position 'from which he 
cannot escape by the exercise ·or ordinary care.' 
In other words, it is not enough, under the last 
clear chance. doctrine, that the plaintiff is merely 
approaching a p·osition of danger, for wntil he has 
reached a position of danger, he has the same op-
portu;nity to avoid the acci~ent by the exercise of 
ordinary care, as·has the defendant. In such cases, 
the ordinary rules of negligence and contributory 
negligence apply, rather than the exceptional doc-
trine of last clear chance. It is only in cases in 
which, after plaintiff reaches a position of danger, 
defendant has a last clear chance to avoid the ac-
cident by the exercise of or.dinary care, and plain-
tiff has no similar chance, .that the doctrine is ap-
licable." (The court's italics.) 
And the court discusses this qualification further on 
page 464 by stating that the defendant must have had 
the last charnce and also had a clear chance to avoid 
the accident. 
Under the facts and circumstances in this case 
the deceas·ed had an opportunity at any time up to the 
point at which he made his sudden turn to the left to 
avoid the collision with ap·pellant's automobile. Under 
such circumstances the last clear chance doctrine is 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
44 
not ~applicable. See Richardson et al v. R'ibosso, (Calif.) 
8 Pacific ( 2) 226, at page 227, where the court said: 
'' The evidence, however, does riot bring the 
case within the rule where the last clear chance 
doctrine becomes applicable, a rule which limits 
its application to a ease where the person injured 
is known to be in a place of peril from which he 
cannot extricate himself by the exercise of ordi-
nary care. * * * The liability is pl·aced upon 
the party inflicting the injury only if immediately 
before the actual infliction of . the injury the in-
jured person was in such a situation as to be 
unable, by the exercise on his part of reasonable 
and ordinary care to extricate himself, and vigil-
)ance on his part would not have averted the ~n­
jury." And cases cited. (Italics ours). 
If . this boy had looked up at any time during this 
sequence of events, there was nothing to prevent him 
from seeing the car which was in the act of passing 
him and the boy's mere looking would have been suf-
ficient to avoid the accident be·cause all he w~ould have 
had to do w~as. continue in a direct line to the north 
instead of turning- and no collision would have occurred. 
See Graham v. Johnson, 166 Pacific (2) 230, at col-
umn 2 page 236. 
We think it appropriate to call to the court's ~at­
tention that in three successive decisions of this court 
involving the last clear chance doctrine in which there 
were moving vehicles involved, this court has set up 
a further limitation upon the use of that doctrine. We 
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refer to Hickok v. Skinner, 190 Pacific (2d) 514, at 
page 517, where the court said: 
''The last clear chance doctrine, relied on by 
plaintiff, is inapplicable in the present instance. 
As has been repeatedly announced by this court, 
this doctrine is of limited application in the case 
of two moving vehicles.'' 
This matter was further ~asserted in Giren v. Nor-
ton, 213 P·acific ( 2d) 356 : 
* * * ''It has oft been held by this court that 
the doctrine is of limited application in cases in-
volving two moving vehicles. The soundness of 
this rule is apparent when it is appreciated that 
the .doctrine only applies when the ·defendant has 
reasonable time and opportunity to avoid the 
accident. Stated in another way, the plaintiff 
only escapes the consequenees of his own negli-
gence when the defendant has a clear chance to 
avoid the accident.'' 
French vs. Utah Oil Refining Company, 216 Pa-
cific (2d) 1002 is to the same effect. 
In all three of the above cases the situations under 
consideration were the crossing of an intersection or 
turning left through approaching traffic. We believe 
the aforementioned limitation is applicable to a case 
where one vehicle attempts to pass another and the 
vehicle being passed is suddenly turned from direct 
lane of travel across the path of the p1assing car. In 
all three of these types of cases the situation change8 
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so rapidly and the relative positions of the vehicles 
is so different from time to time that there is no reas-
onable opportunity for a party to appreci~ate the peril 
and to avoid the collision. The policy behind such a 
limitation of the doctrine of last clear chance has been 
stated by this court in Graham v. Johnson, on rehear-
ing, 172 Pacific ( 2) 665, 109 Utah 365 as follows: 
* * * ''When one party thrusts upon another 
the onus of ~avoiding an accident which was due 
entirely to the fact that the first party is in the 
fairly rapid process of placing himself in the path 
of a car driven by the second party, the court, 
before it permits the jury to determine whether 
the second party could have avoided the acci-
dent, must be reasonably sure that there was 
time enough for the jury to so find. Where the 
situation is, to reasonable minds, so doubtful as 
to whether the second party had time to avoid 
it, the matter should not be given to the jury; 
otherwise, we are, as said in the case of Thomas 
v. ,Sadleir, Utah, 162 P. 2d 112, 115, in grave 
danger of permitting the one really at 'fault to 
shift the blame for the accident on the other by 
accentuation of the other's duty to avoid the ef-
fect of the first one's negligence.' " 
This quotation was cited with approval in V.an 
Wagoner v·. Union Pacific R. Co., 186 Pacific (2) 293, 
at bottom of ·page 301. 
We submit that the plaintiff did not prove the most 
necessary element to invoke the doctrine of last clear 
chance. We quote : 
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• * * "One should not be held liable for fail-
ing to avoid the effect of the other's negligence in 
a situation where it is speculative as to whether 
he \vas afforded a clear opportunity to avoid it. 
In a situation where both parties are on the move 
the significance of the word 'clear' is most im-
portant. Otherwise we may put the onus of avoid-
ing the effect of one's negligence on a party not 
negligent. That party's negligence only arises 
when it is definitely established that there was 
ample time and opportunity to avoid the accident 
which was not taken advantage of.'' Italics ours. 
Graham v. Johnson (first decision) 166 Pacific (2) 
230, at 237, 238, 109 Utah 346. 
The instruction on the last clear chance doctrine (Point 3d). 
The argument we have made in the immediate 
foregoing portion of this brief is pertinent here. We 
do not think there was any place in the case for in .. 
struction No. 14 (R 29) at all, which was excepted to 
at R 293. Under the evidence there was no question 
present for the jury to decide, and consequently it was 
reversible error to give an instruction on the doctrine. 
It is also our contention that the instruction itself 
is bad in substance, and as it was framed and given 
to the jury it did not appraise the jury· of the proper 
elements of the law with respect to the doctrine of 
the last clear chance. We rely for reversal on this 
ground on the following propositions: 
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1. There is no evidence in the record showing 
the deceased w~as unable to extricate himself from a 
perilous position, until he made his sudden turn, and 
from that point we concede that neither one of the 
parties could do anything. The last paragraph of in-
struction No. 14 should not have been given. 
It is apparent from the evidence that up until the 
time he made his sudden turn Gary Morby could have 
avoided the collision by looking around, because he 
then would have seen the appellant ahout to pass him 
and could have continued- north on the highway in 
safety. This is not the case of a man who ''goes to 
sleep on ia railroad track or gets his foot caught in a 
frog,'' and cannot therefor extricate himself or by 
"alertness avoid the danger," Graham v. Johnson 
(first hearing), supra, 166 Pacific (2) 230, at 235, 
where the court discusses the provisions of section 479 
of Restatement of Torts. Rather, this is the situation 
this court warned was not covered by the doctrine at 
page 236, column 2, bottom portion, of the above case. 
2. The instruction as a whole fails to give due 
weight to the significance of the requirement that the 
jury find that the appellant have a last chance ~and a 
clear opportunity to avoid the collision after being 
aware that deceased was in a position of peril; and in 
this connection the court's statement ''then you are 
instructed that the defendant Walter Lawrence Rogers 
had the last clear chance to avoid the collision" took 
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that question from the jury and is in effect a comment 
on the evidence. 
This is a case like Gra·ham v. Johnson, supr.a1, where 
the situation was constantly changing, and we believe 
the law as to an instruction as therein set out is applic-
able here. 
We quote from the Court's first decision 1n that 
case at pages 237 and 238 of 166 Pacific (2): 
* * * "In a case such as this whe~ both par-
ties are more or less rapidly changing their posi-
tions the evidence must be clear and convincing 
that the party whom it is c1aime·d could have 
avoided the accident had a ''clear'' ch.ance to do 
so. 
* * * ''the jury must be instructed that it 
should be clearly convinced in such a case that 
she (defendant) was far enough north of him 
(plaintiff) ~as to give her a clear chance to avoid 
the accident.'' * * * 
* * * "In those intermediate situations such 
as the supposition under the evidence that Dar-
lene was coming down on the far ·west side of the 
street where the court is in doubt as to whether 
all reasonable minds could conclude one way or 
the other he should submit the case to the jury 
with instructions that it should be clearly con-
vinced that the defendant had a clear chance, viz., 
ample opp·ortunity or clearly an existing ability 
at the time she reasonably should have appre-
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ciated the plaintiff's danger, to avoid harming 
him; otherwise it (the jury) should find for the 
defendant. 
''From our recitals of the evidence and our 
exposition of the 1aw, it is apparent that the jury 
must be given an opportunity to determine what 
the facts of the case really are, and that it must 
be armed by instructions from the court in ac-
cordance with the law herein laid down to apply 
the proper law to the fact situation or situations 
as it finds them." (Italics and words in brackets 
ours). 
3. That the phrase ''even though both parties 
were negligent and even though the negligence of both 
parties concurred in eausing the death of Gary Morby", 
being the last lines of instruction No. 14, is not a law, 
and would allow the jury to find a verdict for the plain .. 
tiff without their finding that the appellant's failure, 
if any, to avail himself of his opportunity to avoid 
the collision was the sole proxim·ate cause of the acci .. 
dent, which is a necessary element for the jury to find 
before plaintiff can recover. 
The law does not permit a recovery where two 
parties' negligence concur in an injury, and the last 
clear c~ance doctrine is no exception to this, because 
the theory of the. doctrine is that defendant's negli-
gence, in failing to avoid the plaintiff, is the sole cause 
of the accident. We again cite Graha1n v. Johnson 
(first decision). The Court at page 236 of 166 Pacific 
(2) after assuming a situation \vhere tvvo parties are 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
51 
negligent, states: 
* * * ''Both up to that point might be guilty. 
of negligence and neither he able to recover 
against the other. But if the oncoming driver 
(the defendant), realizing the situation of the 
plaintiff, had 1a clear opportunity to avoid the ac-
cident and failed to utilize it, that counts just as 
if the plaintiff had not been negligent, and the 
defendant had been. An incorrect but rather 
dramatic day of putting it is that defendant's 
first negligence and plaintiff's negligence cancel 
out leaving only defendant's failure to utilize his 
opportunity to avoid the accident as the negli-
gen-ce. The first and only negligence which is the 
basis of recovery under the clear chance doctrine 
is this failure of the defendant to avoid the harm, 
having the knowledge and ability to do so.'' 
This language here complained of strikes the en-
tire instruction down, and permits a recovery without 
any last clear chance. It takes from the defendant any 
defens'e of contributory negligence. 
C-ONCLUSION 
If this court determines that Gary Morby at the 
time of this accident was under the -duty of obeying 
the statutory requirements set forth in S·ection 57-7-133, 
this case should be rev.ers·ed. The co·urt by its instruc-
tion No. 12 stated in effect that that s~atute did not 
apply to Gary Morby. By its refusal to give appellant's 
request No. 1, or some similar instruction, the court 
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held that that statute did not apply to. Gary Morby. 
This is contrary to the law. 
If this court holds that the appellant was not negli-
gent or tha.t the decedent's negligence proximately con-
tributed to the accident, then this cas·e should be re-
versed with instructions to set the judgment aside and 
enter judgment for the appellant, no cause of action. 
We respectfully submit that the trial court tried 
this case on a theory not tenable under the law and 
permitted the jury to decide it on a theory not tenable 
in law. 
EDGAR C. JENSEN 
ROBERT A. BURNS 
ROBERT JOHN JENSEN 
A.tt:orneys for Appellant 
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